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 
Abstract— An empirical study evaluated key human factors 
issues related to automation visibility and information quality, 
based on a refined definition of information automation. Next 
Generation Air Transportation System operational concepts will 
dramatically affect the types and amount of information available 
on flight decks. Information automation systems collect, process, 
and present information to support pilot tasks and awareness. The 
definition of flight deck information automation was refined to 
differentiate it from other types of automation. Pilots interacted 
with an example information automation system to investigate the 
premise that automation visibility will have an impact on the 
ability of pilots to detect problems resulting from poor information 
quality. Poor information quality appeared to be difficult for pilots 
to detect, even when presented with high automation visibility. 
Pilots tended to over-trust automation, so when reporting high 
workload and information was missing, they chose the top plan 
suggested by the automation even though it was not the best. Trust 
in automation was reduced by low information quality, but 
compensated for by increased automation visibility. Added 
information to help pilots understand information automation 
state and outputs, given a level of information quality, should be 
balanced against potential increases in pilot workload due to the 
time and attention needed to process the extra information.  
Index Terms— Automation Visibility, Human Factors, 
Information Automation, Information Quality, 
I. INTRODUCTION 
conomic factors and rapidly emerging technology have
continued to be the driving forces behind automation 
system development, resulting in a shift of human roles and 
responsibilities from an active operator to essentially that of 
monitor, error handler, and automation manager [4], [5], roles 
for which it is known that humans are not well suited [6], [7]. 
Conveying the right information at the right time to human 
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operators and accepting input from them in a user-friendly 
manner is critical for safe operations. As manufacturers develop 
applications to accommodate the demand for new capabilities, 
they must consider the implications of human factors issues in 
the design of the interactions between pilots and automation. 
In the aviation domain, modern flight decks utilize 
sophisticated automation systems. Beyond current operations, 
there is considerable research and development in new 
automation, procedures, and concepts to safely and efficiently 
handle an increasing demand for air travel. Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) will utilize satellite-based 
navigation and interconnected database systems to guide and 
track air traffic more precisely than previously feasible [1]. This 
transformation will result in new automation to take advantage 
of the likely increase in the amount of available information [2]. 
NextGen operational concepts and technologies will 
dramatically affect both the types and amount of information 
available on flight decks [3].  
The literature on human factors aspects of flight deck 
“automation” typically makes little distinction among different 
types of automation (e.g. [8], [9]). However, there may be 
different human factors issues depending on the type of 
automation being considered. Much of the automation currently 
being developed pertains to information support rather than 
aircraft control. Information automation is defined as 
automation devoted to the management and presentation of 
relevant information to flightcrew members [11]. The 
Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee/Commercial Aviation Safety Team Flight Deck 
Automation Working Group has recommended that a stronger 
definition of information automation is needed, as well as 
defining associated terms [11]. Based on definitions of Billings 
[12] and Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens [13], we 
developed a two-dimensional description of flight deck 
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information automation [14] that considered what is being 
managed (aircraft, systems, or information), and the stage of 
information processing involved.  
Certain human factors issues and pilot errors which might be 
prevalent in interacting with information automation may be 
minimal for other types of automation. The primary goals of 
information automation systems are to promote situation 
awareness and assist in decision making tasks for the 
flightcrew, both of which are specifically related to human 
information processing and cognition. Conversely, direct 
control of the aircraft and its subsystems are more heavily 
dependent on psychomotor skills and strategic mission 
planning. As such, there are likely unique human factors issues 
that must be considered when designing the interaction 
behavior of information automation systems that differ from 
other types of automation.  
More automation will push flight crews into becoming more 
of mission, task, and information managers, to the point where 
management knowledge and skills are as important as 
traditional flying skills. Some of these “cognitive” skills could 
include “information triage” – categorizing and prioritizing 
information quickly and efficiently, searching and accessing 
information, and validating information quality.  To investigate 
the role automation support has in these cognitive skills, an 
empirical study evaluated human factors issues related to the 
interaction between Automation Visibility and Information 
Quality. Information Quality is the degree to which the 
information is fit for use and can affect whether the information 
can be reliably used by the automation or the pilot [15]. 
Automation Visibility is the degree to which information is 
available to assist the user in understanding the system’s 
behavior [4]. This includes the means by which the system 
provides information to allow the pilot to understand what 
sources of information the system uses as input, what reasoning 
it uses, and how it generates outputs.  
II. FLIGHT DECK INFORMATION AUTOMATION FRAMEWORK
A. Definition and Framework 
Billings [12] distinguished information automation from 
control automation (which directly impacts the motion of the 
vehicle) and management automation (which impacts efficient 
mission completion). While control automation is clearly 
distinct from information and management automation, further 
details to distinguish these latter two are necessary.  
Information automation is applicable to many different 
domains [17]. Landry [2] suggests that information automation 
is distinguished from other types of automation as it is intended 
to provide information to support reasoning by the operator (as 
opposed to supporting rule-based or skill-based behavior). 
Abbott et al. [11] define information automation as “automation 
devoted to the management and presentation of relevant 
information to flightcrew members.” We adopt this definition 
here, but for clarity, we decomposed information automation 
into more specific categories, presented in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. A two-dimensional framework for describing information automation. 
The horizontal dimension of the framework shows “What is 
controlled or acted upon?” The column headings represent 
parameters similar to the aviation automation types identified 
by Billings [16] and reflect what the automation is controlling: 
the aircraft, the mission, or information. Requirements for 
integrity and redundancy levels will be different depending on 
whether the automation is managing or acting upon controls, 
planning, or information, as will the detectability of errors. The 
rows show what stage of information processing is being 
performed by the automation. We apply the four-stage 
information processing model described by Parasuraman et al. 
[13]: (1) Information Acquisition, (2) Information Analysis, (3) 
Decision Selection, and (4) Action.  
In the framework presented here, the definition of 
information automation is expanded to include not only the first 
two stages of processing, but also the final two stages if what is 
being controlled is information itself. For instance, decision 
automation may or may not be classified as information 
automation. Automation in the Decision-Selection/Information 
cell that evaluates display options to decide the best way to 
convey information to the pilot would be information 
automation. More specifically, the framework can be used to 
define different areas considered to be information automation: 
• Early information processing stages (information
acquisition, information analysis) linked to control and
management automation
• All information processing stages for automation where
information is the primary commodity being controlled,
processed and presented
• Feedback loops present information on statuses and states
for control and systems automation (while these loops
might not strictly be considered information automation,
similar human factors issues likely apply).
Automation that manages or acts upon information (4th 
column in Fig. 1) and support the decision selection (4th row in 
Fig. 1) stage of processing is the principal focus of this study. 
Decision selection tasks require “cognitive” skills including 
categorizing and prioritizing information quickly and 
efficiently, searching and accessing information, and validating 
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information quality[19]. 
The design of automated decision aids should include 
considerations of how much information is made available to 
the operator about the rationale, criteria, uncertainty, and 
determining factors used in forming the aid’s judgments and 
actions [18]. The uncertainty considered by the automation, and 
how that uncertainty is communicated to the human, also 
impact operator decision making [20] and performance [21]. As 
automation takes over these types of tasks, the amount of 
visibility into the reasoning of the automation, as well as the 
quality of information used by the automation are important as 
humans monitor and assess the outputs of the automation. To 
investigate the role automation support has in these cognitive 
skills, the study in this paper focused on Information Quality 
and Automation Visibility, described below. 
B. Information Quality 
Previous research in information quality originated in 
database administration and management of information 
systems ([22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [15]). Wang and Strong 
[15] identified four properties of high quality data: 1) 
intrinsically good, 2) contextually appropriate for the task, 3) 
clearly represented, and 4) accessible to the data consumer. 
They further identified 15 dimensions within the four properties 
to capture the usefulness of information as a product, or 
commodity, to the consumers who seek it (see Table I). The 
evaluation in this paper focused on dimensions of completeness 
and appropriate amounts of data of the information used by the 
automation to make its recommendations.  
The dimensions of information quality include many aspects 
of information systems directly relevant to pilots as consumers 
of information automation output. For example, automatic de-
cluttering of a display aims to provide only the most relevant 
and timely information for a given situation [27]. Information 
quality can be degraded by [22]: erroneous system input; 
incomplete, uncertain, or probabilistic input; poor assumptions 
or unaccounted for factors [28]; flawed or imprecise processing 
(e.g. due to a limited or constrained model) [29]; conflicting 
inputs from a variety of data sources; inaccurate or unreliable 
outputs [30]; and delayed or untimely information. 
C. Information Automation Visibility 
Automation Visibility refers to the ability of an automation 
system to provide adequate feedback to the user about its 
current state, what information was used, and how the 
information was processed [32], [33]. This characteristic has 
also been referred to as transparency, opacity, or observability 
(e.g. [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]). Various related 
definitions include the support an operator’s comprehension 
about the intent, performance, and the reasoning process [37]. 
Others include the concept of “broadening” where a system can 
reveal multiple solutions to enable the joint human-automation 
system to explore a broader set of candidate solutions [42]. 
In order for automation to be visible, feedback must provide 
a view into the automation state in a manner which can be 
properly interpreted by the operator [41] and allows the 
operator to predict its behavior [43]. This includes information 
about input sources and how the system is generating outputs. 
High automation visibility enhances predictability by fostering 
the development of an accurate mental model and enables the 
flightcrew to verify outputs. Poor automation visibility has been 
shown to result in a loss of situation awareness and an increase 
in workload [44], [45]. However, the appropriate amount and 
timing of “explanatory” information must be carefully 
evaluated because too much information presented at an 
inappropriate time (e.g., during time-critical tasks) adds 
workload and head down time [46], [47]. Broadening the 
number of options considered, for instance, could increase the 
amount of information to process, thus increasing operator 
workload unless there is a concomitant offloading of complex 
calculations [37]. Studies have shown that inadequate 
automation visibility contributes to information automation 
human factors issues including: poor predictability of behavior 
[48], [43]; hard-to-detect input or processing errors [44], [4]; 
difficult-to-assess Information Quality and verify outputs [48], 
[4]; and inadequate, inappropriately timed, or inappropriate 
amount of system feedback (e.g., modes) [10], [11].  
In addition, human-automation interaction is complicated by 
a feedback loop between the automation’s judgments and the 
human's information seeking, cue utilization, and judgment 
policy [18]. Studies have shown that if the algorithms used by 
the automation are highly complex, and are dissimilar from the 
human’s strategies or not understood by the human, the 
automation’s outputs were ignored [49], [50]. On the other 
hand, overly simplistic strategies were disregarded as nuisances 
[51]. The type and level of information about automation 
reasoning and behavior has a strong effect on the human’s trust, 
and results in under- or over-reliance on automation [39], [54]. 
Increased automation visibility may actually decrease trust, if 
the greater visibility reveals that the information is less reliable 
[37]. Therefore, increased visibility may result in more 
appropriately calibrated trust [39]. Furthermore, the amount and 
type of information about the underlying logic greatly 
influences how pilots use that awareness when forming 
strategies and responses. For instance, Pritchett [52] 
demonstrated that pilot non-conformance increased when a 
traffic display that provided position-based measures of 
collusion hazards, but the underlying alerting system’s logic 
TABLE I 
CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS OF INFORMATION QUALITY [15] 
Intrinsically 
Good 
Contextually 
Appropriate for 
Task 
Clearly Represented Accessible to 
Data 
Consumer 
Believability 
Accuracy 
Objectivity 
Reputation 
Value-added 
Relevancy 
Timeliness 
Completeness  
Appropriate 
amount of data 
Interpretability 
Ease of Understanding 
Representational 
consistency  
Concise representation 
Accessibility 
Access 
security 
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was based on convergence rate. 
III. METHOD
An experiment explored the interplay between automation 
visibility and information quality in the context of a decision 
aiding automation. Automation visibility was operationalized 
as the amount of information that automation provides about 
the reasoning behind its recommendation, and Information 
quality is operationalized as the completeness of the 
information about which the automation reasons. 
A. Hypothesis 
Automated systems can suffer from brittleness when the 
system model does not account for all possible scenarios. For a 
decision support system, presenting recommendations 
compromised by system brittleness can strongly degrade 
decision-making [53]. Increasing automation visibility may 
help to prevent automation surprises [34], increase the ability 
of human operators to understand what the system is doing 
[31][35], and critique the information quality of inputs to the 
automation [19]. However, the increased information will 
require more time and resources to process and validate 
automation reasoning [19]. The evaluation is based on a 
premise that automation visibility will have an impact on the 
ability of pilots to detect problems resulting from poor 
information quality. Specifically, there were three hypotheses 
tested in the study. 
H1) Increased information quality will result in better primary 
task performance compared to lower information quality. 
H2) Increased automation visibility will result in increased 
primary task performance, increased confidence in 
decisions, and increased trust in automation, increased 
automation awareness, but at a cost of higher workload and 
higher attention allocation to the display. 
H3) Increased automation visibility will result in increased 
ability for pilots to compensate for poor information 
quality in the automation to maintain overall primary task 
performance (i.e., the difference in primary task 
performance between the low and high information quality 
conditions will be greater when automation visibility is low 
than when the visibility is high). 
B. Participants 
Twelve air transport pilots from a cross section of regional 
and major airlines were recruited. All were male. Five were 
Captains and seven were First Officers. All had flown glass 
cockpits. Average age was 34.2 (range 24-56) with about 7,000 
flight hours (range: 2,000-14,000). Participants rated their 
familiarity with glass cockpits as 4.9 of a 5-point scale (SD = 
0.3), trust in automation as 3.85 (SD = 0.58), and level of 
authority in diversion decision making as 4.08 (SD = 1.08). 
C. Experiment Task: Diversion Decision-Making 
1) Background
To test the hypotheses, a Diversion Aid was developed as an 
example of automation that controls information (Fig. 1, 4th 
column) to support the participants in decision specification 
(Fig 1, 4th row). Historically, diversion decisions have been a 
collaborative effort between the pilot and airline dispatchers. 
The Diversion Aid is envisioned for a future where pilots take 
advantage of the increased information available in NextGen to 
take primary responsibility for diversion decisions. While the 
primary goal is safety, diversion decisions have significant 
impact on downstream airline operations, including the 
schedules for aircraft, crew, maintenance, and passengers. 
Experienced dispatchers will consider the operational 
implications of diversions [55]. There are typically several 
different diversion plans possible that will maintain safe flight 
and landing profiles, but the plans differ widely in their impact 
on airline operations, profit, crew and staff convenience, and 
customer satisfaction. In future operations, it is anticipated that 
pilots will be expected to take a more active role in considering 
these aspects of diversion decisions. 
2) Diversion Aid
The Diversion Aid integrates multiple information sources 
on the current state of flight, aircraft, maintenance, crew, and 
passenger schedules to display the implications of diversion 
decisions to pilots. The goal is for pilots to integrate the goals 
and priorities of interested airline operations stakeholders into 
the decision making process. This was based on a previously 
developed system [55] that uses a set of policy statements and 
cost values developed after interviews with airline dispatchers, 
pilots, and various stakeholders (see Table II). The policy 
statements represent the operational priorities of all 
stakeholders affected by diversion decisions and assess the 
overall “goodness” of a diversion plan. For a particular plan, 
each policy violation was associated with cost points. Diverting 
a flight with an unaccompanied minor costs 10 points, while 
delaying a flight greater than 15 minutes costs 8 points. The 
goal of selecting a diversion option that minimizes the total cost 
incurred: the lower the cost, the better the plan. 
3) Displays
The Diversion Aid presented the original scheduled flight
plan, followed by up to three diversion plans, ranked based on 
minimizing policy violations. Fig. 2 is an example of high 
visibility, where the original plan is shown at the top for 
comparison to the three suggested plans below. Each plan 
TABLE II 
POLICY STATEMENTS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING COST VALUES. 
Policy Statement Cost 
Do not exceed crew duty limits (nine hours flying time per day) 10 
Do not divert a flight with an unaccompanied minor 10 
Do not divert a flight with an arriving international passenger to an 
airport that does not have passport control 
10 
Do not divert passengers connecting to an international flight 8 
Do not delay flights greater than 15 minutes 8 
Do not divert to an airport that has its maximum capacity of aircraft 8 
Do not cause crew to miss next flight assignment 5 
Do not cause passengers to fail to reach destination 3 
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depicts the flight schedule of the aircraft (airport codes between 
the horizontal bars). If there is text within a bar, this indicates 
that there is a policy violation on the flight, with the number of 
points above it. Depiction of each individual policy violation 
allows pilots to understand how the Diversion Aid ranked one 
plan ahead of another. The code (e.g. Px, Int) described the 
category of the violation, and there is a key at the bottom of the 
display for quick reference. Pilots can also access a help tab to 
see the policy violations and their weights (Table II). A second 
row of flights may be displayed for a plan if a dependency 
between this aircraft and others exists; for example, if a flight 
crew was going to transfer to a different aircraft. Yellow 
triangles indicate scheduled maintenance. The total Decision 
cost is presented next to the select button. Option 1 of Fig. 2 
suggests diverting the current (first) flight of the day from DEN 
to APA, and then continuing on to ABQ (thereby recovering the 
scheduled third stop). This incurs 11 points of policy violations 
for the passengers who were expecting to deplane at APA, and 
8 points for international passengers who will now miss their 
connections. The second and third leg of this plan each both 
incur 8 points, due to passenger impacts, for a total plan penalty 
of 27 points. Medium visibility would be the same display but 
without the policy violations and points displayed. Low 
visibility would only depict one alternate option. 
D. Tasks/Scenarios 
Participants performed two tasks: 1) select/reject a diversion 
plan with the help of the Diversion Aid, and 2) report traffic as 
it appeared in an out-the-window display. In every trial, 
participants knew they would be diverted, but did not know 
when in the scenario they would be instructed to divert. 
1) Diversion Plan Selection
Participants were told that the Diversion Aid had already 
considered all aspects of flight safety, such as remaining fuel 
and runway lengths at suggested diversion airports. As such, 
they were to focus on consequences of diversion options from 
an airline operations perspective. Participants acted as the pilot 
monitoring. In the pre-flight briefing, the confederate pilot 
reviewed the day’s schedule, weather, and pre-planned 
diversion airport. These briefings contained both relevant and 
irrelevant information specific to the diversion task, in order to 
provide the information that might be needed to make a correct 
decision without explicitly stating that the information would 
be required. For example, the participant may be briefed that 
their flight has an unaccompanied minor on board. The 
information in the briefings changed with each flight. 
Participants were informed that the Diversion Aid may not 
always have the most current or correct information. 
Participants were also told that the briefings had the most 
accurate and up-to-date information and they, as pilots, had the 
final authority in the diversion decision. After reviewing the 
Diversion Aid’s recommended plan(s), the participant decided 
whether to accept one of the plans or to reject its 
recommendation(s) if he or she felt a better plan could be 
devised. The participant did not need to create a different plan. 
A Help menu displayed the policy set and was always available. 
2) Reporting Traffic
A secondary task of reporting traffic in a simulated out-the-
window view was given to measure workload as a secondary 
task during the diversion selection task. Traffic appeared out the 
window in random locations at random times and did not move. 
Every five seconds, the probability of traffic being displayed 
was 60% (a set point determined during pre-experimental 
testing). If traffic appeared, it remained in view until the 
participant pressed a button, or five seconds had elapsed. 
E. Independent Variables 
Table III summarizes the two independent variables: 
Information Quality and Automation Visibility.  
In the high Information Quality condition, the correct 
selection was always the top option on the display. In the low 
Information Quality condition, the correct selection was not the 
top selection, because the automation was missing information 
that resulted in incomplete scoring of the options. However, 
participants were given knowledge of this “missing” 
information during the pre-flight briefing. Therefore, in the low 
Information Quality conditions, the automation’s highest 
TABLE III 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE EVALUATION. 
Independent 
Variable 
Levels Description 
Information 
Quality
 
Low 
Some relevant information was not included in the 
calculation of total diversion decision cost 
High 
All relevant information was included in the 
calculation of total diversion decision cost 
Automation 
Visibility 
Low Best option only 
Medium Rank-ordered list of the three best options 
High
Rank-ordered list of the three best options with the 
costs shown 
Fig. 2. Diversion Aid with high Automation Visibility, displaying the top three 
ranked options with policy violations. 
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ranked plan was not actually the best plan – participants were 
expected to recognize that a different plan was better once they 
included the missing information (known to them) into to their 
assessment. Selecting the top recommendation of the aid would 
be the correct (best) selection 0% of the time in the low 
Information Quality condition and 100% in the High 
Information Quality condition.   
Automation Visibility was defined as the amount of 
information that the automation reveals about its reasoning. 
This includes the number of options considered, the rules used 
to assess these options, the consequences of each option, the 
benefits and costs associated with each option, and the 
stakeholders that are impacted by the options. There were three 
levels of Automation Visibility: 1) low visibility, where a single 
best option was presented; 2) medium visibility, where a ranked 
list of the top three options is presented; and 3) high visibility, 
where a ranked list of the top three options with the cost values 
were shown (see Fig. 2). In all cases the automation makes a 
recommendation to the pilot.  In the low visibility condition 
only this recommendation is shown. The medium visibility 
condition broadens the exposure to the automation’s reasoning 
by presenting not only the recommendation but two other plans 
considered but not recommended. Finally, the high visibility 
condition shows three plans plus the policy violations that drove 
the scoring. The independent variable Automation Visibility 
manipulated two types of information: presentation of the 
number of options, and the costs associated with each option. 
Other types of information were kept constant: the rules used to 
assess these options (policy definitions), the consequences of 
each option (depiction of the downstream schedules), the 
stakeholders impacted by the options (categories of 
stakeholders affected by policy violations).  
The difference between the medium and high Automation 
Visibility conditions is the display the costs associated with 
each option, and is a manipulation the underlying logic of the 
automation [36][38][40]. The difference between the low and 
medium Automation Visibility conditions can be considered as 
a manipulation of the level of decision automation (the third 
stage in the framework) in the tradition of Parasuraman et al 
[13] and Sheridan & Verplank [56]. The low Automaton 
Visibility has a high level of decision automation (offer only 
one alternative), and the medium Automaton Visibility is a 
lower level of decision automation (offer multiple options) [56]. 
Thus the three levels of Automation visibility are a nested 
combination of presenting two types of information: 1) level of 
decision automaton (number of options presented) and 2) the 
display of automation reasoning, in which visibility is nested 
within low level automation. The design is summarized in 
Table IV. Overall, the low visibility condition contains the least 
amount of information, and the high visibility combination 
contains the most. 
A third independent variable was originally included: 
Display Modality (text, graphic), with identical information 
content. However, since there were no statistically significant 
differences between the text and graphic displays, the data were 
collapsed over this variable. 
F. Dependent Variables 
See Table V for a summary of the dependent variables in the 
study. Decision Performance was measured by the time to make 
a diversion decision and the correctness of the decision. In all 
Automation Visibility levels, the participant could select a plan 
or select a “Reject All” option. Time to make a decision was the 
elapsed time from the start of the diversion task (i.e. when the 
participant was informed of the need for a diversion) until 
participants made their diversion plan selection. Workload 
while selecting a diversion plan was measured subjectively via 
the NASA-TLX questionnaire [57]. Traffic detection 
performance can be considered an objective measure of 
workload. Attention Allocation was estimated by collecting 
head-tracking data (InterSense® InertiaCube2) and calculating 
the percentage of time the participant spent looking at the 
Diversion Aid while selecting a plan. Confidence in their 
decision, Automation Awareness, and Trust in the Aid’s 
recommendation were measured via a Likert scale question 
administered after each trial. The five-point scale was labeled 
with numbers 1 through 5 to underscore the interval character 
of the scale. The Automation Awareness question asked 
participants to provide their level of understanding of how the 
Diversion Aid arrived at its recommendations. In the post-
experiment questionnaire participants were asked to describe 
their decision-making strategies in the different Automation 
Visibility conditions in an open-ended question.  
TABLE V 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE EVALUATION. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Metric Unit 
Frequency of 
Collection 
Decision 
Performance 
Selection of best plan yes/no once per trial 
Time to make a selection 
(all responses) 
seconds once per trial 
Time to make a selection 
(correct responses only) 
seconds 
once per trial 
(correct trials only) 
Workload 
NASA TLX 0 - 10 once per trial 
Ratio of detected traffic 
vs. all traffic targets 
presented 
% 
2x trial - 
before and during 
diversion 
Attention 
Allocation 
Time spent on primary 
and secondary displays 
(app vs. out-the-window) 
seconds once per trial 
Confidence Likert Scale 1 - 5 once per trial 
Automation 
Awareness 
Likert Scale 1 - 5 once per trial 
Trust Likert Scale 1 - 5 once per trial 
Decision Aid 
Features 
Free Response Post-experiment 
TABLE IV 
DEFINITIONS OF THE THREE LEVELS OF AUTOMATION VISIBILITY. 
Automaton Visibility Levels:  Low Medium high 
Information presented 
1 option 
No logic 
3 options 
No logic 
3 options  
Logic 
Level of automation reasoning Low Low High 
Level of decision automation  High Low Low 
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G. Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experiment was a 2 (Information Quality: low, high) x 3 
(Automation Visibility: low, medium, high) within-subjects 
design. Participants performed six (counterbalanced) diversion 
scenarios. The experimental conditions were also 
counterbalanced. Participants trained with the Diversion Aid, 
tasks, and post-trial questionnaires, with periodic quizzes to test 
understanding of the aid’s calculations and recommendations. 
Participants were expected to critically review the Aid's 
recommendations to select/reject the diversion plans presented. 
Flight simulation began approximately 10 minutes from top of 
decent, during which they were responsible for identifying 
traffic out the window. After 60-90 seconds, the need for a 
diversion was announced by the confederate and the participant 
was asked to make a recommendation within five minutes. 
Pilots were told to make a diversion decision as quickly as they 
were comfortable that they had made the best decision. After 
each decision, they filled out the NASA-TLX workload scale 
and post-trial questionnaire. After all six scenarios, they filled 
out a post-experiment questionnaire and were debriefed. 
H.  Data Analysis Plan 
A repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used 
for normally distributed data. Non-parametric Wilcoxon tests 
were used for non-normally distributed Likert rating data. 
Results are reported as significant for alpha <.05, and 
marginally significant for alpha <.10 [58]. The abbreviation 
“ns” is used to denote non-significant results. Tukey post-hoc 
tests determined significance between pairwise comparisons of 
normally distributed data groups. Results will present letters 
above each group; the letters indicate significant (at the .05 
level) pairwise differences between groups when they do not 
share a letter. Cohen’s d calculated an effect size and provides 
a standard measure that expresses the mean difference between 
two groups in standard deviation units. Cohen’s d results are 
reported as small effects for .20 < d <.50, medium effects for 
.50 < d <.80, and large effects for d >.80. 
IV. RESULTS
A. Decision Performance 
Fig. 3 depicts the plan selection results as a function of 
Information Quality and indicates significant pairwise 
differences between groups when they do not share a letter. 
Information Quality introduced a significant (F(1,11) = 33.0, p 
< .001, d = 1.72) increase in the percentage of correct plans 
chosen from the low Information Quality condition (M = 
36.1%, SE = 8.1%) to the high Information Quality condition 
(M = 86.1%, SE = 5.8%). Automation Visibility (F(2,22) = 0.31, 
p = .73 ns) and the interaction between Automation Visibility 
and Information Quality (F(2,22) = 0.65, p = .53 ns) did not 
introduce significant differences.  
Fig. 4 depicts the plan selection time as a function of 
Automation Visibility. Automation Visibility introduced a 
significant (F(2,22) = 3.67, p = .042) difference in the time to 
make a selection between conditions, with all trials considered. 
Post hoc analysis indicated that pilots in the low Automation 
Visibility condition (M = 49.2, SE = 6.6) were significantly (p 
= 0.043, d = 0.98) faster than pilots in the high Automation 
Visibility (M = 81.1, SE = 10.8). Information Quality (F(1,11) 
= 2.87, p = .12 ns) and the interaction between Automation 
Visibility and Information Quality (F(2,22) = 0.44, p = .64 ns) 
did not introduce significant differences.  
When considering only correct response trials, Automation 
Visibility introduced a significant (F(2,13.4) = 4.79, p = .027) 
difference in the time to make a selection between conditions. 
Post hoc analysis indicated that pilots in the low Automation 
Visibility condition (M = 45.0, SE = 8.0) were significantly (p 
= 0.034, d = 1.15) faster than pilots in the high Automation 
Visibility (M = 81.9, SE = 14.5). Information Quality 
introduced a significant (F(1,12.4) = 8.2, p = .014) decrease in 
the selection time from the low Information Quality condition 
(M = 77.2, SE = 15.8) to the high Information Quality condition 
(M = 58.6, SE = 8.7). The interaction between Automation 
Visibility and Information Quality (F(2,8.4) = 0.13, p = .88 ns) 
did not introduce significant differences.  
B. Subjective Workload (NASA-TLX) 
  Of the six subscales of the NASA TLX workload survey, 
only mental demand and temporal demand showed significant 
results (see Fig. 5). Automation Visibility introduced a 
marginally significant (F(2,22) = 3.41, p = .051) difference on 
mental demand between conditions (see Fig. 5 left). Post hoc 
analysis indicated that pilots in the low Automation Visibility 
condition (M = 3.2, SE = 0.37) were significantly (p = .047, d = 
0.95) lower than pilots in the medium condition (M = 4.6, SE = 
0.51). Information Quality (F(1,11) = 1.18, p = .30 ns) and the 
interaction between Automation Visibility and Information 
Quality (F(2,22) = 2.32, p = .12 ns) did not introduce 
Fig. 3. Correct selection percentage as a function of Information Quality. 
Fig. 4. Plan selection time as a function of Automation Visibility (all trials). 
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significant differences. 
Automation Visibility introduced a significant (F(2,22) = 
4.56, p = 0.022) difference on temporal demand between 
conditions (see Fig. 5 right). Post hoc analysis indicated that 
pilots in the low Automation Visibility condition (M = 2.6, SE 
= 0.31) experience significantly (p = 0.027, d = 0.79) lower 
temporal demand compared to pilots in the medium level (M = 
3.8, SE = 0.53) and marginally significantly (p = 0.068, d = 
0.71) lower than pilots in the high Automation Visibility 
condition (M = 3.6, SE = 0.45). Information Quality (F(1,11) = 
0.239, p = .63 ns) and the interaction between Automation 
Visibility and Information Quality (F(2,22) = 0.118, p = .89 
ns) did not introduce significant differences. 
C. Objective Workload: Secondary Task Performance 
Information Quality introduced a marginally significant 
(F(1,11) = 4.18, p = 0.065, d = 0.57) increase in the percentage 
of targets detected from the low Information Quality (M = 76.4, 
SE = 4.8) condition to the high Information Quality (M = 86.7, 
SE = 3.7) condition (see Fig. 6). Automation Visibility (F(2,22) 
= 0.74, p = .49 ns) and the interaction between Automation 
Visibility and Information Quality (F(2,22) = 0.41, p = .66 ns) 
did not introduce significant differences. 
D. Attention Allocation 
Automation Visibility introduced a significant (F(2,22) = 
9.21, p = 0.001) difference in the amount of time spent on the 
decision aid between conditions (see Fig. 7).  
Post hoc analysis indicated that pilots in the low Automation 
Visibility condition (M = 31.0%, SE = 3.2%) spent significantly 
(p = .003, d = 0.93) less time on the aid than pilots in the 
medium Automation Visibility (M = 41.6%, SE = 3.1%) 
condition and significantly (p = .002, d = 0.96) less time than 
the high Automation Visibility (M = 41.3%, SE = 3.1%) 
conditions. Information Quality (F(1,11) = 2.33, p = .16 ns) 
and the interaction between Automation Visibility and 
Information Quality (F(2,22) = 0.48, p = .62 ns) did not 
introduce significant differences.  
E. Confidence 
 Information Quality did not introduce significant (Z = 1.59, 
p = 0.11 ns) differences in the rating of reported confidence. 
Automation Visibility did not introduce any significant 
differences between the three levels (see Fig. 8).  
F. Automation Awareness 
Automation Visibility introduced a significant (Z = 2.38, p = 
0.017, d = 1.08) increase in the rating of automation awareness 
from the medium Automation Visibility condition (M = 3.1, SE 
= 0.19) than pilots in the high Automation Visibility condition 
(M = 3.8, SE = 0.16) (see Fig. 9).  
Pilots in the medium Automation Visibility condition also 
had a marginally significantly (Z = 1.75, p = 0.08, d = -0.71) 
lower automation awareness than pilots in the low Automation 
Visibility condition (M = 3.3, SE = 0.20). Information Quality 
did not introduce a significant (Z = 0.832, p = 0.41 ns) 
difference in the automation awareness rating from pilots   
Fig. 5. Mental demand (left) and temporal demand (right). 
Fig.6. Target detection time as a function of Information Quality. 
Fig. 9. Automation Awareness as a function of the independent variables. 
Fig. 8. Confidence rating as a function of Information Quality. 
Fig. 7. Percent time spent with head directed toward the Diversion Aid as a 
function of Automation Visibility. 
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G. Trust 
Automation Visibility introduced a significant (Z = 2.14, p = 
.032, d = 0.99) increase in pilot ratings from the low 
Automation Visibility condition (M = 3.4, SE = 0.22) than pilots 
in the high Automation Visibility condition (M = 4.0, SE = 0.13) 
(see Fig. 10). Pilots in the medium Automation Visibility 
condition (M = 3.6, SE = 0.18) also had a significantly (Z = 
2.05, p = 0.041, d = 0.87) higher automation awareness than 
pilots in the low Automation Visibility condition. Information 
Quality introduced a marginally significant (Z = 1382, p = 
0.068, d = 0.57) increase in the trust rating from pilots in the 
low Information Quality condition (M = 3.5, SE = 0.17) to pilots 
in the high Information Quality condition (M = 3.9, SE = 0.13). 
H. Decision Aid Features 
The most common positive feedback from participants 
regarding low and medium Automation Visibility level was its 
simplicity; however, in both levels, participants wanted more 
information and reasoning behind the best plan they were being 
shown (i.e. higher Visibility). The feedback regarding the 
medium Automation Visibility level was the most varied. Three 
participants very much liked that three options were offered to 
them without reasoning information (i.e. costs) to evaluate on 
their own. Three others commented that they thought this was 
the worst level to work with because they wanted to either have 
the best option only (i.e. low Automation Visibility) or the 
options with the costs (i.e. high Automation Visibility) 
provided. Generally, participants preferred the inclusion of 
reasoning information in the high Automation Visibility 
condition, where three participants commented that they liked 
having some insight into the financial impact of their diversion 
decisions. Two participants, however, commented that they did 
not care at all about those details. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis H1 was partially supported. Diversion plan 
selection performance was significantly higher when 
Information Quality was high compared to selection 
performance when Information Quality was low. In addition, if 
only the trials where a correct selection was made are 
considered the time to select was affected by Information 
Quality. However, the time to make a selection was not affected 
by Information Quality when all trials were considered.  
Hypothesis H2 was partially supported. The level of 
Automation Visibility did not affect the selection of the best 
plan, although it did affect decision time (both when 
considering all trials and when considering only correct trials), 
with low Automation Visibility leading to the fastest decision 
time. Since there is less information in the low Automation 
Visibility level, less attention was required to observe and 
orient to the task. Between the two higher Automation 
Visibility levels, the attentional requirements were similar. 
Although more information is provided at the high level, it was 
information that was relevant to the decision task and having it 
readily available may offload cognitive resource requirements, 
thus balancing the overall attentional requirements.  
In low Information Quality, an increase in Automation 
Visibility from low to high also showed an increase in trust, 
eventually reaching the trust level seen at high Information 
Quality, where trust remained constant between Automation 
Visibility levels. First consider only the low and medium levels 
of Automation Visibility, where the number of options is 
different. There is no effect between these levels on automation 
awareness and trust. However, next consider only the medium 
and high levels of Automation Visibility, where the number of 
options is the same. Increased Automation Visibility for low 
Information Quality increases both automation awareness and 
trust. In this study, high levels of trust in the automation’s 
recommendations lead to failures to override sub-optimal 
Diversion Aid recommendations.  Confidence did not vary 
across conditions. This had a negative impact on decision 
performance when Information Quality was low.  
The low level and medium level of Automation Visibility 
varied in the number of options shown, and can be considered 
a different level of automation, where the display of a single 
option (low Automation Visibility) is a higher level of 
automation. Workload increased from the low to medium level 
as one would expect as the level of automation decreases. The 
level of automation was constant between the medium and high 
levels of Automation Visibility, but the inclusion of cost 
information in the high Automation Visibility condition 
reduced the workload needed to assess the three options. One 
participant commented that he preferred either the low or the 
high Automation Visibility level, as the medium Automation 
Visibility level (ranked options without cost) was too much 
work to interpret: “The single option was superior to rank 
ordered because a decision made without seeing the reason can 
just be a suggestion. Three suggestions without the reason 
behind add more workload. Having the decision cost allowed 
quicker decision making and a more informed decision.” In low 
information quality, the highest workload was in the medium 
automation visibility condition, where three plans were 
presented (hence a lot of information) but the rationale (i.e. 
policy scores) were not presented, forcing the participant to 
spend extra effort assessing the quality of each plan. The 
performance on the secondary task, which can be taken as an 
indirect measure of workload, was not significantly affected by 
Automation Visibility. However, the allocation of attention was 
Fig. 10. Trust as a function of the independent variables. 
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significantly less for low Automation Visibility and greatest in 
high Automation Visibility. 
Hypothesis H3 was partially supported. Participants had a 
difficult time detecting when the automation was reasoning 
over incomplete information, despite the fact that the missing 
information was known to them. Participants only detected the 
incomplete information about a third of the time. While 
previous research in this area (e.g., [45], [59]-[62]) suggests that 
pilots should be able to compensate for poor automation 
decisions (in this case driven by poor Information Quality), the 
results of this study indicate that the type of information 
presented to increase automation visibility plays an important 
role. Two factors were used to increase Automation Visibility: 
broadening the number of options shown, and display of the 
underlying logic. Increasing the number of options increased 
the workload, attention required, and decision time with no 
benefit to automation awareness and trust. Displaying the 
underlying logic also increased selection time, but it reduced 
workload. Also, the increased visibility into the underlying 
logic helped compensate of low formation quality when 
compared to presenting three options with no logic. 
The complexity of the display may also have made it difficult 
for participants to detect missing information, even when they 
knew they were looking for it (e.g., the participant who was 
actively searching to make sure that the unaccompanied minor 
was in the plan, yet failed to detect that that piece of information 
was missing). Their generally high trust in the automation 
caused pilots to spend less time checking for missing 
information. While they had five minutes to make a decision, 
the average decision time was within 90 seconds. Even when 
they intuitively knew something was “not quite right” (as 
evidenced in the increased time spent making a decision in low 
Information Quality conditions), they often failed to detect the 
missing information. 
While definitive conclusions are limited by the small number 
of participants in the study, several areas are presented for 
further study. Several recommendations are presented in the 
context of the flight deck human factors considerations 
described in the FAA Advisory Circular AC 25.1302 [1]. 
Appropriate levels of information quality could be defined 
for information automation systems, based on the potential 
impact of the information on flight safety. This study only 
looked at a subset of the dimensions of information quality 
(data that was missing or incomplete). Future work could 
investigate other dimensions of information quality.  Various 
categories of information quality should be considered, 
including: intrinsic quality, contextual quality, representational 
quality, and accessibility. Within these categories are various 
properties such as accuracy, completeness, and timeliness. AC 
25.1302 (p. 28) states that “…information intended for the 
flightcrew’s use must be provided … at a resolution and 
precision appropriate to the task.” Precision and resolution are 
key aspects of quality, but for information automation systems, 
completeness and timeliness of information can be important.  
While increased automation visibility (from medium to high) 
increased exposure to the underlying reasoning, the additional 
information presented to the participant was not specifically 
about the quality of the information it used to reason. Future 
work could explore the benefits of the automation displaying its 
own assessment of information quality. This could provide 
more redundancy in the joint human-automation system, since 
both the pilot and the automation should ideally be assessing 
the quality of the information.  
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of the empirical study suggest that pilots may or 
may not be able to spend extra effort searching for validation 
information. Providing too much automation visibility 
information, especially in busy phases of flight, created 
workload issues. If an information automation system provides 
choices or alternatives, information on how those choices were 
determined and their relative merits should be provided. The 
study did not show a clear preference for a decision aid that 
showed the best option only versus one that showed multiple 
options with cost information. However, most participants 
wanted visibility into how those options, if presented, were 
determined. They felt it was too much work to determine why 
the system prioritized the options the way that it did. In 
comparison to the best option or options with supporting 
information, presenting options with no supporting information 
resulted in lower performance, slower performance, higher 
workload, more attention, and lower automation awareness. But 
adding information about trade-offs or the automation 
reasoning for selecting options could also add workload, 
reinforcing the need to balance visibility with increased 
information processing requirements. 
Other areas of future work include investigation of cognitive 
skill degradation. As new information systems are introduced 
into both air transport, business jet, and general aviation 
markets, increasingly automation is tasked with functions that 
include calculating, comprehending, reasoning, prediction, and 
decision making. Much like physical (e.g. flying) skills, it is 
equally as critical is the retention of the cognitive skills that 
allow pilots to maintain situation awareness at all times, quickly 
assess new situations, and make the best decision from the 
options available to them [63]. 
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